My primary fields of training are international relations and comparative politics, and I am well versed in quantitative methods. Therefore, my research interests broadly comprise conflict processes at the international level and at the regional level with special emphasis on South Asia – a salient region both in terms of international and regional security. My primary research agenda includes two broad areas. The first area of my research explores how grievances and opportunities drive political violence, especially terrorism. I argue that resorting to terrorism is a rational choice which is conditioned by the availability of mobilization opportunities. Democracy is such an opportunity which interacts with grievances in producing terrorism. Similarly, state capacity influences the selection of strategy by rebel groups in their violent anti-state campaigns.
The second area of my research involves territorial claims and conflict (both intrastate and interstate). Territorial disputes between states have been major predictors of interstate conflict. Similarly, struggle for territory (i.e., a homeland) has engendered some of the most violent conflicts (civil war, insurgency and terrorism) in history. With this in mind, firstly, I am interested in exploring whether territorial claims destroy peace between trading partners/economically integrated dyads. Secondly, some discriminated minorities often fight for territory or homeland, whereas others fight for policy change. It is interesting why some groups fight for separate territory and others not, and I intend to explore this matter empirically. Moreover, my future research plans also include examining such conflicts based on territorial claims in South Asia. Some of the projects that I am working on are discussed below.
Terrorists as Rebels: Territorial Goals, Oil Resources and Guerrilla Warfare in Terrorism
Recent studies show that the terrorist organizations which target civilians almost always fail to achieve their ultimate objectives. On the contrary, groups able to adopt guerrilla warfare as a complementary strategy have better chances of success. Therefore,terrorist organizations might tend to use guerrilla tactics to achieve their political goals if they are rational actors. Still, most of them do not engage in guerrilla warfare.An organization’s decision to engage the state in guerrilla warfare might depend on how the organization can alleviate the collective action problem. Groups can overcome this problem if a high value issue such as territorial goal is involved. In addition, the possibility of access to oil resources that can be appropriated for private gains improves recruiting and encourage a terrorist organization to adopt high-risk guerrilla warfare tactics. Interestingly, organizations with territorial claims are found to shun guerrilla style attacks in oil rich countries. Although non-territorial groups are more likely to adopt guerrilla tactics in the presence of oil resources, they tend to avoid such strategy as countries become richer.
Territory and Transnational Terrorism: A Dyadic Analysis (Co-author: Aaron Gold)
There is a growing literature that looks at how international relations affect terrorism. Some scholars argue that cooperative relations result in more transnational terrorism while others argue increases are due to contentious behavior. At the same time, territorial disputes are a major source of contention and threat to interstate security, yet most recent studies of terrorism have failed to take this into account. In this article, we investigate the relationship between measures of territorial contention and higher levels of transnational terrorism. Using a politically relevant directed dyadic dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that territorial and more salient territorial conflict associates with higher levels of transnational terrorism. We also find support for extending the bargaining framework to non-state actors; when an origin state, the state home to a transnational group launching an attack, is weaker relative to its counterpart, higher numbers of transnational incidents are likely to result.
Terrorists as Rebels: Roles of Group Strength and State Capacity in Dissidents’ Strategy of Political Violence
Extant literature has explored why rebels use terrorism in civil war. However, little scholarly work exists on why terrorist organizations sometimes engage the state in armed conflict. This paper argues that dissidents in their struggle against a state for political concession strategize their actions in anticipation to the target state’s possible response. Organizational strength of the terrorists and state capacity interact to produce strategies of violence. If the state is strong to impose costs on weak dissidents, they will target defenseless population in pressuring the state. In case the state is weak and cannot effectively retaliate against the dissidents’ act of violence, the latter will gain strength and adopt the conventional method of directly confronting the state in armed conflict. This study empirically tests this hypothesis on all terrorist organizations between 1987 and 2005 and finds that strong terrorist organizations are likely to use guerrilla warfare in attacking combatants in weak states along with targeting civilians. This intuitive argument has not been empirically tested so far in conflict literature.
Regime type, State capacity and Religion as Drivers of Suicide Attacks: An Analysis (Co-author: Gabriella Nicole Larose)
Deriving data from CPOST dataset, this study shows that suicide attacks take place in countries which are neither fully democratic not totally autocratic. Liberal democracies are mostly secular where political leaders seldom use religion, a major driver of suicide attacks, as their primary mobilization strategy, thus delegitimizing extreme religious views. Moreover, presence of institutionalized conflict resolution mechanisms in fully democratic states makes suicide terrorism a less attractive option. Another important pattern in suicide attacks is that strong countries are more vulnerable to suicide attacks than others. Rebels always fear capture; hence suicide attack is an optimal strategy where the possibility of capture is high. A set of regression models on a dataset of terrorist organizations between 1970 and 2006 mostly supports these data-driven analyses.
The second area of my research involves territorial claims and conflict (both intrastate and interstate). Territorial disputes between states have been major predictors of interstate conflict. Similarly, struggle for territory (i.e., a homeland) has engendered some of the most violent conflicts (civil war, insurgency and terrorism) in history. With this in mind, firstly, I am interested in exploring whether territorial claims destroy peace between trading partners/economically integrated dyads. Secondly, some discriminated minorities often fight for territory or homeland, whereas others fight for policy change. It is interesting why some groups fight for separate territory and others not, and I intend to explore this matter empirically. Moreover, my future research plans also include examining such conflicts based on territorial claims in South Asia. Some of the projects that I am working on are discussed below.
Terrorists as Rebels: Territorial Goals, Oil Resources and Guerrilla Warfare in Terrorism
Recent studies show that the terrorist organizations which target civilians almost always fail to achieve their ultimate objectives. On the contrary, groups able to adopt guerrilla warfare as a complementary strategy have better chances of success. Therefore,terrorist organizations might tend to use guerrilla tactics to achieve their political goals if they are rational actors. Still, most of them do not engage in guerrilla warfare.An organization’s decision to engage the state in guerrilla warfare might depend on how the organization can alleviate the collective action problem. Groups can overcome this problem if a high value issue such as territorial goal is involved. In addition, the possibility of access to oil resources that can be appropriated for private gains improves recruiting and encourage a terrorist organization to adopt high-risk guerrilla warfare tactics. Interestingly, organizations with territorial claims are found to shun guerrilla style attacks in oil rich countries. Although non-territorial groups are more likely to adopt guerrilla tactics in the presence of oil resources, they tend to avoid such strategy as countries become richer.
Territory and Transnational Terrorism: A Dyadic Analysis (Co-author: Aaron Gold)
There is a growing literature that looks at how international relations affect terrorism. Some scholars argue that cooperative relations result in more transnational terrorism while others argue increases are due to contentious behavior. At the same time, territorial disputes are a major source of contention and threat to interstate security, yet most recent studies of terrorism have failed to take this into account. In this article, we investigate the relationship between measures of territorial contention and higher levels of transnational terrorism. Using a politically relevant directed dyadic dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that territorial and more salient territorial conflict associates with higher levels of transnational terrorism. We also find support for extending the bargaining framework to non-state actors; when an origin state, the state home to a transnational group launching an attack, is weaker relative to its counterpart, higher numbers of transnational incidents are likely to result.
Terrorists as Rebels: Roles of Group Strength and State Capacity in Dissidents’ Strategy of Political Violence
Extant literature has explored why rebels use terrorism in civil war. However, little scholarly work exists on why terrorist organizations sometimes engage the state in armed conflict. This paper argues that dissidents in their struggle against a state for political concession strategize their actions in anticipation to the target state’s possible response. Organizational strength of the terrorists and state capacity interact to produce strategies of violence. If the state is strong to impose costs on weak dissidents, they will target defenseless population in pressuring the state. In case the state is weak and cannot effectively retaliate against the dissidents’ act of violence, the latter will gain strength and adopt the conventional method of directly confronting the state in armed conflict. This study empirically tests this hypothesis on all terrorist organizations between 1987 and 2005 and finds that strong terrorist organizations are likely to use guerrilla warfare in attacking combatants in weak states along with targeting civilians. This intuitive argument has not been empirically tested so far in conflict literature.
Regime type, State capacity and Religion as Drivers of Suicide Attacks: An Analysis (Co-author: Gabriella Nicole Larose)
Deriving data from CPOST dataset, this study shows that suicide attacks take place in countries which are neither fully democratic not totally autocratic. Liberal democracies are mostly secular where political leaders seldom use religion, a major driver of suicide attacks, as their primary mobilization strategy, thus delegitimizing extreme religious views. Moreover, presence of institutionalized conflict resolution mechanisms in fully democratic states makes suicide terrorism a less attractive option. Another important pattern in suicide attacks is that strong countries are more vulnerable to suicide attacks than others. Rebels always fear capture; hence suicide attack is an optimal strategy where the possibility of capture is high. A set of regression models on a dataset of terrorist organizations between 1970 and 2006 mostly supports these data-driven analyses.